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Abstract
The paper studying the 1995 EU–Turkey Customs Union (CU) delivers a quantitative assessment
of trade and GDP per capita effects of the CU on the Turkish economy. Our Synthetic Control
Method based analysis reveals, contrary to the results of most studies in the literature, that the
CU’s effects have been substantial by any standards. In particular, the paper shows that in the
absence of the EU–Turkey CU, Turkish exports to the EU and GDP per capita would have been
38 per cent and 13 per cent less, respectively.
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1. Introduction
In 1959, Turkey applied for associate membership of the then-European Economic Com-
munity (EEC). The application resulted in an Association Agreement (the Ankara Agree-
ment) between the EEC and Turkey in 1963, whereby the parties agreed to create, inter
alia, a Customs Union (CU). The CU was established on 1 January 1996 through the
European Union (EU)–Turkey Association Council Decision 1/95, covering industrial
goods including processed agricultural commodities but excluding European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC) products. A free trade agreement (FTA) between the ECSC
and Turkey was signed on 29 February 1996, with European Commission Decision
96/528/ECSC covering the ECSC products.
Twenty years have passed since the start of the EU–Turkey CU, and it is time for an
ex-post assessment. In this paper we provide such an assessment using the micro-
econometric technique of the Synthetic Control Method (SCM), developed by Abadie
and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010). Our main contribution is that this is
the first paper, as far as we know, using SCM in assessing the impact of the
EU–Turkey CU.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 1 studies what the CU has meant for
Turkey, and section 2 explains the SCM. Section 3 shows the results and robustness
checks using the SCM. The final section concludes.
1.1. European Union–Turkey Customs Union
The EU–Turkey CU Decision (CUD) of 1995 required Turkey to eliminate all customs
duties, quantitative restrictions, charges with an equivalent effect to customs duties, and
all measures with an equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions in the trade of industrial
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goods with the EU as of 1 January 1996. In addition, Turkey was required to adopt the
EU’s Common Customs Tariff (CCT) on third-country imports and adopt all the prefer-
ential agreements the EU had/has concluded and would/will conclude with third
countries. Thus, over time, Turkey has concluded FTAs with Israel, Macedonia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Palestine, Tunisia, Morocco, Syria, Egypt, Albania, Georgia,
Montenegro, Serbia, Chile, Jordan, Mauritius, South Korea and Malaysia. As a result
of the CU Turkey’s economy-wide nominal protection rate (NPR) in trade with the EU
as well as with third countries has decreased substantially.1 Regarding access to the
Turkish market, almost all countries in the world have benefited from NPR reductions
in Turkey. On the other hand, regarding access of Turkish goods to the EU market, note
that the EU had abolished nominal tariff rates on imports of industrial goods from Turkey
on 1 September 1971. In addition to tariffs and related issues, the EU–Turkey CU require-
ments extend to rules and disciplines on various regulatory border and behind-the-border
policies, such as customs modernization, eliminating technical barriers to trade (TBTs),
competition policies, intellectual property rights and trade policy instruments.
Prior to the formation of the CU, Turkey had a complicated import regime. The cus-
toms administration was a traditional paper-based organization and declarants had to go
to customs offices to register declarations. Since almost all shipments had to be physically
inspected, the process at customs was very intrusive and time consuming. It often led
traders to pay substantial facilitation money to speed up the process or to curry favour
with customs officials in charge of their inspections. On the other hand, until the forma-
tion of the CU, Turkey did not have the quality infrastructure required for the elimination
of TBTs nor the required technical knowledge. The state monopoly Turkish Standards
Institute (TSE) was the National Standardization Body, provider of services for quality
testing and accreditation services, and the authority setting technical regulations. The
quality infrastructure was not linked up with international networks, and any accreditation
granted by the Turkish accreditation body was not recognized internationally. Similarly,
until the adoption of the EU–Turkey CU, Turkey had no specific competition legislation
and thus no competition policy enforcement. Similar considerations hold for the protec-
tion of intellectual property rights. Finally, note that prior to the formation of the CU,
Turkey did not have rules and regulations on anti-dumping, countervailing duties, surveil-
lance, safeguards measures, administering quantitative quotas and procedures for offi-
cially supported export credits as in the EU.
With the CU Turkey has modernized its customs administration and adopted a new
customs law similar to the EC’s Customs Code. To eliminate the TBTs Turkey to a very
large extent has harmonized its standards with European and international standards, har-
monized its technical legislation with that of the EU, established the quality infrastructure
comparable to the EU’s, encompassing the operators and operation of testing, certifica-
tion, inspection, accreditation and metrology, and developed a market surveillance and
import control system as in the EU. Harmonization with EU regulations comprised both
New and Old Approach directives and mutual recognition in the non-harmonized area. In
the case of competition policy Turkey with the CU has adopted EU competition rules,
including measures regarding public aid. In the case of protection of intellectual property
rights, the country with the CU established the Patent Office, and has made substantial
1 See Togan (1997).
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efforts to align its legislation with the acquis. Finally, note that Turkey since the forma-
tion of the CU has successfully adopted the EU rules and regulations on trade policy
instruments and is effectively implementing them. These are remarkable achievements.
The reforms have decreased trade costs substantially in trade between the EU and
Turkey, and improved market access conditions for Turkish exports into the EU as well
as for EU exports into Turkey. However, there are still areas where Turkey needs further
alignment of its legislation and implementation with the acquis as emphasized recently by
the European Commission (2015).
The EU–Turkey CU of 1995 has been a major instrument of integration into the EU and
global markets for Turkey, offering the country powerful tools to reform its economy. It
has credibly locked Turkey into a liberal foreign trade regime for industrial goods and
holds the promise of Turkey’s participation in the EU internal market for industrial prod-
ucts. As a result, Turkish producers of industrial goods have become exposed to competi-
tion from imports and they operate within one of the largest FTAs for industrial products in
the world. They are now protected by tariffs from external competition to exactly the same
extent that EU producers are, and as such, face competition from duty-free imports of
industrial goods from world-class pan-European firms. In return, Turkish industrial pro-
ducers have duty-free market access to the European Economic Area.
The existing literature on the effects of the EU–Turkey CU includes both ex-ante stud-
ies and ex-post studies. While the ex-ante studies are in general of computable general
equilibrium (CGE) type, the ex-post studies mostly use gravity models to assess the
impacts of the CU on trade and welfare. One of the earliest ex-ante studies of the
EU–Turkey CU is that by Harrison et al. (1997). Using a CGEmodel, the authors conclude
that the CU generates welfare gains for Turkey of 1–1.5 per cent of its GDP. On the other
hand, Mercenier and Yeldan (1997) argue that the CU reduces welfare in Turkey. In a more
recent ex-ante study, Lejour and de Mooij (2005) estimate the effects of the EU–Turkey
CU for both the EU countries and Turkey. On the basis of a CGEmodel for the world econ-
omy, the authors find that the effect of Turkey’s accession to the single market is substan-
tial and positive for Turkey, and negligible for the EU-15. Among the ex-post studies, the
findings of Antonucci and Manzocchi (2006) and Bilici et al. (2008) reveal that the
EU–Turkey CU does not have any role to promote additional trade between parties. In con-
trast, Adam and Moutos (2008), Nowak-Lehmann et al. (2007) and Neyaptı et al. (2007)
support positive impacts of the CU on trade flows. Furthermore, two recent studies which
are the only ones using the gravity model based on the theoretical foundations of Anderson
and van Wincoop (2003) are of major importance. The World Bank (2014) estimates a
gravity model using a dummy variable for the EU–Turkey CU. The coefficient estimate
for average treatment effect was 0.2 suggesting a 22 per cent increase in bilateral trade
due to the CU, though this effect was not statistically significant.2 On the other hand,
2 The World Bank report emphasizes that empirically it is difficult to argue that the CU has caused a major shift in relative
trade shares for Turkey because the EU had already opened its markets for Turkish exports of industrial goods long before
the CU came into effect. Furthermore, the study notes that a potential FTA between the EU and Turkey as opposed to the
present EU–Turkey CU would lead to significant reductions in EU imports from Turkey. The study further reveals that
Turkey’s real income would increase with the finalization of non-compliant FTAs such as those with Mexico, South
Africa, Columbia, Peru, Panama, Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua. Finally, the report shows
that successful conclusion of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the EU and the United States
while excluding Turkey would adversely affect Turkey’s terms of trade and welfare.
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Magee (2015) concludes that the CU has generated more than twice as much trade creation
as trade diversion, but that the overall impact of the CU has been relatively small.3
It is important to note that in the framework of the EU–Turkey CU, Turkey has not
only eliminated tariffs and quotas on the trade of industrial commodities with the EU
but has also adopted EU rules and regulations on customs, TBTs, competition policies,
intellectual property rights and trade policy instruments. Therefore, the CU can be seen
as the prior step for Turkey’s EU integration but this integration may not end up with full
membership of EU since an open-ended membership framework has been introduced af-
ter the enlargement of 2004 (Karakas, 2013; Ugur, 2010). The general consensus in
Turkey on the CU is that it has been beneficial for the country not only because of trade
creation effects of the CU due to lower tariffs but also due to welfare increasing steps to-
wards an economy with high integration with the global economic system and effective
institutions enhancing developments. Since these beneficial indirect effects could not be
estimated using earlier methods (such as gravity models), we use the micro-econometric
SCM in this paper to determine the concrete benefits/losses the EU–Turkey CU has gen-
erated for Turkey by concentrating on the CU’s effects on trade and the GDP
2. Synthetic Control Method
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) employ SCM to evaluate the effect of terrorism in Spain,
while Abadie et al. (2010) estimate the impact of California’s programme to reduce
tobacco consumption in California. Lee (2011) investigates the success of inflation
targeting in reducing inflation rates and Billmeier and Nannicini (2013) evaluate the
impact of economic liberalization on GDP per capita. The idea behind SCM is to approx-
imate the relevant characteristics of the country affected by an intervention using a
weighted combination of potential control countries, which is the synthetic control. The
SCM can be used to estimate the counterfactual situation in the country by using the syn-
thetic control in the absence of the intervention. The counterfactual shows what the
outcome of the affected country would have been if the intervention had not happened.
In our case, the synthetic control helps us answer what the level of exports to the EU
and the GDP per capita in Turkey would have been if the EU–Turkey CU had not been
established.4
Formally, the general idea behind the SCM is as follows: Let Y 0it be the outcome
(exports or GDP per capita) that would be observed for country i (Turkey) at time t in
the absence of the intervention (membership in the CU) for units i=1 , … , J+1 and time
periods t=1 , . . . ,T. Let T0 be the intervention period, where 1≤T0≤T. Let Y 1it be the out-
come observed for country i at time t when the country is exposed to the intervention
between periods T0+1 and T. Then, the treatment effect (the impact of the intervention)
for country i can be defined as τit ¼ Y 1it  Y 0it . However, Y 1it is observed and Y 0it is not
3 A regional trade agreement (RTA) creates a preference favouring trade with an RTA partner country, whose imports face
no tariffs, over other countries whose imports are taxed. When imports from low-cost countries outside the regional trading
area are replaced by imports from higher cost countries within the RTA, we talk of trade diversion. On the other hand, trade
creation is generated when the lower tariffs within the trading block allow inefficient domestic production to be replaced by
cheaper imports from a preferential trading partner.
4 We initially intended to study the effects of the CU on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows as well. However, this could
not be accomplished because of the lack of data on bilateral FDI flows in Turkey.
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observed between T0+1 and T. Thus, Y 0it , which is the counterfactual, must be estimated
to find the impact of the intervention.
Abadie et al. (2010) show how to identify the treatment effect, τit, using the following
model for potential outcomes:
Y 0it ¼ δt þ ZiΘt þ λtμi þ εit (1)
Y 1it ¼ δt þ τit þ ZiΘt þ λtμi þ εit; (2)
where Zi is a vector of relevant observed covariates (either time-varying or time-
invariant) that are not affected by the intervention, Θt a vector of parameters, λt an un-
known common factor, μi a country-specific unobservable, εit a transitory shock with a
zero mean, and τit a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the treated unit, and 0
otherwise.
Suppose that the first country (Turkey), i=1, receives the treatment (membership in the
CU) and the remaining J countries, i=2 , . . . , J+1, do not. The proposed data-driven ap-
proach is to approximate Y 0it by a weighted average of Y
1
it; taking into account the covar-
iates Z for the pre-intervention period, t≤T0, such that:
Y 1t ¼ ∑
Jþ1
i¼2





where the weights, wi, satisfy ∑
Jþ1
i¼2
wi ¼ 1 and wi≥0. These two assumptions for the
weights make sure that there is no extrapolation of outcomes from the model. Finally,
the treatment effect can be estimated using:
bτit ¼ Y 1t  ∑
Jþ1
i¼2
wi Y it for t ¼ T0 þ 1;…; T : (5)
The main idea here is that the synthetic control imitates the counterfactual of the
treated country that would have been observed in the absence of the intervention using
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the weighted average of all control countries. For the optimal choice of W*, consider
X 1 ¼ Z1; Y 11;…; Y 1T0ð Þ to be the vector of pre-intervention characteristics for country
i=1, and X 0 ¼ Zj;Y jt;…; Y jT0
 
to be the matrix of the same characteristics for the
control units j∈ [2, j+1]. Then the vector W* is chosen to minimize the distance between
X1 and X0W, following:
min
W
jjX 1  X 0Wjjv ¼ min
W Vð Þ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
X 1  X 0Wð Þ′V X 1  X 0Wð Þ
p
(6)
s:t:wi ≥ 0 for i ¼ 2;…; J þ 1 and ∑Jþ1i¼2 wi ¼ 1; (7)
where V is a k× k symmetric and positive semi-definite matrix, which measures the rel-
ative importance of the pre-intervention characteristics included in X. Thus, W is a func-
tion of the elements of V. The minimization problem above provides a solution forW*(V*)
that minimizes the pre-intervention Root Mean Square Prediction Error (RMSPE) of the
outcome over the control period. Thus, the accuracy of the approximation depends on the
minimization problem, which is satisfied with a lower RMSPE. In other words, the SCM
estimates the unobserved counterfactual as a weighted average of the outcomes of the
control countries, with weights chosen to approximate the pre-intervention characteristics
of the affected country.
In the choice of control countries, two important assumptions are made. First, the pre-
intervention characteristics, X1, should include variables that can approximate the affected
country but cannot anticipate the effects of the intervention. For instance, if Turkey’s pre-
intervention characteristics can anticipate the effects of the European CU, the synthetic
Turkey would generate a lower-bound estimate because some part of the real effect occurs
before the formation of the CU. Second, the control countries, Yit, used in the minimiza-
tion problem must not be affected by the intervention. For instance, if a European country
is chosen as a control country, Turkey’s involvement in the EU–Turkey CU will be
definitely affected by this country. Thus, the control countries should not affect the
EU–Turkey CU Decision.
Compared to other comparative methods (panel data or difference-in-differences), the
SCM has some evident advantages. In other methods, control units are chosen on the
basis of subjective measures. However, the SCM is data-driven and it chooses control
units that can best approximate the affected unit. Another shortcoming of other methods
is that it is not possible to test whether any of the control units can replicate the evolution
of the affected unit’s outcome. In the SCM, as Abadie et al. (2010) suggest, placebo
experiments can be implemented to make inferences by reassigning the intervention to
each control unit and estimating the intervention effect for each unit. In addition, we
can compare the results with baseline results. In other words, we can assess whether
the baseline results for the treated unit are larger than the effects for countries chosen at
random. Finally, one of the important advantages of the SCM over panel data models
Hüseyin Aytuğ et al.424
© 2016 University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
is that the effect of unobserved heterogeneity does not have to be time-invariant and
independent of the error term, as implied by equation 1. In contrast, panel-data models
control only for confounding factors that are time-invariant (fixed effect) or share a com-
mon trend (difference-in-differences). The SCM method can handle endogeneity due to a
time-varying omitted bias.
3. Results
To analyze what the Turkish export growth to the EU and Turkish GDP per capita would
have been if the EU–Turkey CU had not been established, two independent estimates are
made using the SCM.
First of all, the growth of Turkish exports to 28 EU Member States is taken into con-
sideration. Export growth (the outcome variable) is estimated using characteristic vari-
ables of the control countries, namely real GDP, distance to the EU, and countries’
areas, chosen in line with the Gravity Model framework.5 All combinations of control
countries are used to achieve the best match to the realized growth of Turkish exports
to the EU and Turkey’s characteristic variables before the treatment period, specifically,
pre-1996, before the formation of the CU.
The best match for Turkey’s realized export growth (outcome variable) and the other
characteristic variables (such as, minimum distance between synthetic and realized out-
come and characteristic variables), is achieved with the related weight of control countries
shown in Table 1. These weights for those control countries are obtained as a result of the
minimization problem described in equations 6 and 7. Following the minimization pro-
cess, not only Turkey’s synthetic export growth but also synthetic characteristic variables
(real GDP, distance to EU, and area) are also calculated, using the weights for each con-
trol country. As evident from Table 2, the gaps between actual and synthetic outcomes
and the characteristic variables are quite small.
5 The empirical literature explaining trade flows based on gravity models explains exports mainly by real GDP, bilateral
distance between countries, and area. The other explanatory variables used in gravity models are binary variables for com-
mon language, membership of a regional trade agreement, common border and common colonial history. However, the lat-
ter set of variables could not be used as characteristic variables due to the methodological properties of the SCM. For studies
using the variable of countries’ areas, see Glick and Rose (2002), Longo and Senkat (2004) and Soloaga and Winters
(2001).
Table 1: Country Weights for the Synthetic Controls








South Africa 0 0.19
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Both the realized and synthetic export growth increases are shown in panel (a) of
Figure 1. As illustrated by the graph, there is quite a close match before the treatment
period (1989–95). After the treatment period, the series labelled ‘synthetic Turkey’ shows
what the estimated Turkish export growth to the EU would have been if the EU–Turkey
CU had not been established. From the figure, it is clear that the realized export growth is
higher than the synthetic one for most years, especially after 2005. This result suggests
that the growth of Turkey’s exports to the EU would have been lower without the forma-
tion of the EU–Turkey CU.6
We repeated the minimization process of both the outcome and characteristic
variables in order to estimate the level of per capita GDP in Turkey without the
EU–Turkey CU. In this case, as suggested by the growth literature, the characteristic
variables are comprised of the ratio of current account balance to GDP in 1990, share
of investment in GDP in 1990 and the industry value added in GDP in 1991, population
growth in 1995, average number of years of education received by people aged 25 years
and older in 1995, and inflation rate in 1992.7 We tried to match those variables as
closely as possible using the country weights obtained as a result of the minimization
process, displayed in the third column of Table 1. As shown in Table 3, the actual and
synthetic series are close to each other before the treatment. The estimated and actual
real GDP values per capita in Turkey throughout the whole period are depicted in panel
(b) of Figure 1. The movement and levels of the actual and synthetic series suggest that
although the actual series is higher than the synthetic one in some years at the
beginning of treatment period, Turkey’s real GDP per capita would have been lower,










Distance to the EU 7.44 9.24
Exports to the EU/GDP(1989) 5.48 1.33
Exports to the EU/GDP(1990) 4.93 5.69
Exports to the EU/GDP(1991) 5.11 5.02
Exports to the EU/GDP(1992) 5.3 4.65
Exports to the EU/GDP(1993) 4.6 3.92
Exports to the EU/GDP(1994) 7.2 3.74
Exports to the EU/GDP(1995) 7.22 4.17
6 The graph of Turkey’s realized and synthetic export to the EU is shown in the Appendix.
7 In line with the empirical growth literature (for example, Barro, 1991), shares of industry and investment in GDP, popu-
lation growth rate, ratio of current account balance to GDP, average schooling years, and inflation rates are used as charac-
teristic variables for the outcome variables of real GDP per capita.
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especially after 2005, if the country had not been part of the CU. These results are sim-
ilar to the results in the first case.
To account for the cumulative effect of reduction of export to the EU and GDP per
capita in 2013, we used numbers illustrated in Appendix Figure. The calculation results
indicate that Turkey would have experienced a lower level of exports to the EU and lower
GDP per capita in the absence of the EU–Turkey CU. Specifically, Turkey’s exports to
EU countries in 2013 would have been lower by 38%. Hence, Turkish exports to the
EU would have been 39.4 million USD instead of 63.6 million USD in 2013. Moreover,
real GDP per capita would have been USD 7,418 instead of USD 8,540 as of 2013. To put
it another way, Turkey’s total exports and real GDP per capita would have been 16% and
13% less in 2013, respectively.
In order to check the robustness of our estimates, we run placebo tests to see whether
our results could have been driven by chance. The main question here is whether we
would have estimated similar effects if we had chosen a random country included in
the dataset. Following Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010), we
applied the SCM to countries that did not become a part of the CU. If the placebo studies
generated similar results to Turkey, then the increase in growth of exports and GDP per
Table 3: Predictor Balance for GDP per capita.
Variable Actual Synthetic
GDP per capita(1989-1991) 5384.53 5363.2
GDP per capita(1992-1995) 5030.54 5049.24
Current Account Balance/GDP(1990) -1.3 -1.52
Invsetment/GDP(1990) 23.66 22.35
Population Growth(1995) 1.9 1.83
Industry Value Added/GDP(1991) 32.69 33.17
Schooling(1995) 5.5 7.26
Inflation(1992) 65.2 53.32
Figure 1: Synthetic Controls. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Twenty Years of the EU–Turkey Customs Union: Effects of EU Integration 427
© 2016 University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
capita would have been driven by other factors than by the CU. If not, our results provide
significant evidence of the positive effect of the CU.
For the robustness tests, we choose the two countries with the largest weights in the
synthetic controls for Turkey. The countries with the largest weights for export growth
and GDP per capita are Chile and Indonesia, and Mexico and South Africa, respectively.
Figure 2 shows the gap in growth of exports for Turkey, Chile and Indonesia. It seems
that the gap is bigger in the pre-intervention period and smaller in the post-intervention
period for Chile and Indonesia. On average, Turkey’s actual exports grow 2.67 percent-
age points more than the synthetic control, and Chile’s and Indonesia’s actual exports
grew 1.22 and 3.53 percentage points less than their synthetic controls do. On the other
hand, the gap for Turkey is smoother compared to the control countries. As we mentioned
above, it is vital to mimic the actual export growth in the pre-intervention period. Another
way to assess the performance of the optimization period is to look at the RSMPEs.
Table 4 reveals that the RSMPE for Turkey is 6.11. In contrast, the RSMPEs for Chile
and Indonesia are 28.13 and 17.56, respectively. One final way to evaluate the signifi-
cance of our results is to look at the ratios of post-/pre-intervention RSMPEs. This ratio
is 1.84 for Turkey, which is at least two times larger than the ratios for Chile and
Indonesia, which are 0.87 and 0.64, respectively. Based on the placebo tests, we can con-
firm that our results are robust for export growth.
The placebo tests for GDP per capita are shown in Figure A1. First, the gap in GDP per
capita for Turkey is smooth during the pre-intervention period and increases in the post-
intervention period. As shown in Table 4, the average gap for Turkey is USD 379. While
the gap is negative for Mexico, it is USD 763 for South Africa. Although there might
seem to be a bigger effect for South Africa, we need to check the pre- and post-
intervention RSMPEs. The former for Turkey is smaller than for both control countries,
which indicates that the optimization performance is better for Turkey. On the other hand,
the ratio of the post-/pre-intervention RSMPE is at least four times bigger for Turkey. The
exact ratios are 3.80, 0.48 and 0.98, respectively. In parallel to the above placebo test, our
estimations provide significant and robust results for GDP per capita as well.
Figure 2: Placebo Tests. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Hüseyin Aytuğ et al.428
© 2016 University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
4. Conclusion
This paper studying the 1995 EU–Turkey CU delivers a quantitative assessment of the
trade and GDP effects of the EU–Turkey CU on the Turkish economy. Our SCM based
analysis reveals, contrary to the results of most studies in the literature, that the CU’s
effects on Turkey’s exports to EU countries and on Turkey’s GDP per capita have been
substantial by any standards.
We estimate what the levels of Turkish exports to the EU and GDP per capita in
Turkey would have been if the EU–Turkey CU had not been formed. The obtained results
show that Turkey would have experienced a lower level of exports and GDP per capita in
the absence of the EU–Turkey CU. Our results indicate that Turkey’s exports to the EU
and Turkish GDP per capita could have been 38 per cent and 13 per cent less,
respectively.
Appendix A: Data
The real GDP series for selected countries (measured in 2005 USD terms) are obtained
from the World Development Indicators (WDI) online database provided by the World
Bank. The other two variables – area and distance – come from the Centre for Interna-
tional Prospective Studies (CEPII) website. Bilateral distance is calculated according to
the great circle formula using the geographic coordinates of the most important and
crowded cities of those countries. The export values of selected countries to EU members
in USD are obtained from the United Nations Comtrade Database, which measures mer-
chandise trade, excluding services trade. The series on real GDP per capita measured in
2005 USD is taken from the WDI database. Share of industry and investment in GDP,
population growth rate, current account balance-to-GDP, and inflation rate come from
the International Financial Statistics Dataset of the International Monetary Fund. Finally,
data on the average number of years of education received by people ages 25 years and
older come from the International Human Development Indicators, provided by the
United Nations Development Program.
The dataset covers the above-mentioned variables for Turkey and for the 18 countries
similar to Turkey for the period 1989 to 2013.8 The frequency of all the time-variant
variables is annual.
8 The selected countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico,
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Russia, South Africa, Thailand and Ukraine.
Table 4: Placebo Test Results.
Growth of Exports GDP per capita
Turkey Chile Indonesia Turkey Mexico South Africa
pre-intervention RSMPE 6.11 28.13 17.56 164.19 2211.92 320.19
post-intervention RSMPE 11.24 24.42 11.29 623.68 1053.41 315.35
post/pre-intervention RSMPE 1.84 0.87 0.64 3.8 0.48 0.98
Average GAP 2.67 -1.22 -3.53 380 253.79 763.61
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